How a £46 billion criminal enterprise made the UK its second home

Just over a month ago, both the UK and US announced sweeping sanctions against a conglomerate called the Prince Group, labelled by the US Government as a ‘Transnational Criminal Organization’. Headed by a politically connected, Chinese-born businessman called Chen Zhi, the group is reported to have engaged in a litany of crimes, including corruption, industrial scale fraud and human trafficking – allegations the Prince Group vigorously denies, and claim are a pretext by authorities to seize billions of dollars’ worth of their assets. 

This criminal enterprise is believed to have generated £46 billion giving its leaders a problem: where to store their money. They settled on the UK and went on a spending spree, with Chen Zhi himself making London his second home. 

The decision by a violent organised criminal gang to make a beeline for the UK suggests Britain has a long way to go if it’s to clean up its dirty money problem. However, the Prince Group’s exploits here provide some ideas on how the UK can make further progress. Below we analyse how the group invested money here and what the UK needs to do itself a harder target the next time a transnational crime organisation comes calling. 

Access to the UK 

The first reason why the Prince Group targeted the UK was ease of access. According to whistleblower testimony to The Times, the US rejected visa requests by Chen Zhi and his associates, but they found the UK to be far more accommodating. Using the infamous Tier 1 investor visa programme, UK immigration waved through the Prince leadership in exchange for a minimum £2 million investment; ‘they got their residence passes fairly quickly’, the whistleblower explained. Previous reporting by Radio Free Asia suggests that two years prior, Chen Zhi had also secured a Cypriot passport through the country’s cash-for-nationality scheme. 

By the time Chen Zhi and his associates applied to enter the UK, the Tier 1 investor visa scheme was already a clear money laundering risk. As far back as 2015 we had raised concerns over poor checks on applicants' source of wealth, with parliamentarians repeatedly flagging that this visa route was being used as a back door for nefarious individuals. Despite the Government temporarily suspending Tier 1 investor visas in 2018, an undercover investigation by Channel 4 released the following year caught legal and financial advisers boasting about the ease with which they secured them for dubious clients. In 2022, ministers eventually scrapped the scheme after its own internal review confirmed it was a dirty money risk. But by then, key Prince Group leaders had already got their hands on a visa. 

Offshore secrecy 

Not only did the Prince Group target the UK itself, but they also made full use of Britain’s offshore financial centres to help move their money into the UK and around the world. 

A 2024 Radio Free Asia investigation highlights how the group formed opaque companies in the Isle of Man, which eventually received gambling licenses. Leaked documents show a bank in this Crown Dependency asked probing questions about Chen Zhi’s source of wealth, however this only resulted in Prince Group finding a money services operator who processed their transactions instead. The Group’s companies were able to obtain a gaming license from the Isle’s regulators, enabling them to process more than $100 million. In March 2025, police raided the premises of these companies as part of an investigation into a large-scale international money laundering scheme, with two individuals arrested and released on police bail. 

The US designation notice also lays bare the Prince Group’s widespread use of corporate secrecy in Britain’s Overseas Territories. In total, the US authorities designated a staggering 28 different British Virgin Islands (BVI) companies for their role in the Prince Group’s global money laundering scheme, as well as four entities in the Cayman Islands. This provides yet more evidence of how corporate secrecy in these jurisdictions has provided cover for criminal activity, and raises questions about the quality of their ‘know your customer’ checks. 

Property and professionals 

Poor due diligence was not confined to Britain’s offshore financial centres, though. In a relatively short period, Chen Zhi and his associates were able to purchase dozens of UK properties worth over £180 million; acquire a fleet of expensive sports cars; and send his children to private schools here. The ease with which this happened calls into question what scrutiny, if any, was paid to these transactions. 

Media first highlighted Chen Zhi’s activities and political status in Cambodia as far back as 2020, which should have triggered more careful review by UK professionals, yet these seem to have been lacking. Mr Zhi and his associates were able to acquire bank accounts here despite leaked banking documents revealing they were unable to sufficient explain the source of their wealth. Chen Zhi’s main UK acquisition, a £94 million office block, was carried out using a share purchase of a BVI company, Noble Title Limited, holding the asset – a high risk and relatively niche form of property purchase. Meanwhile, Chen Zhi’s cousin, Wei Ren Qiu, also acquired 17 new build apartments off-plan – a part of the real estate market the UK Government now recognises as a money laundering risk. 

What should be done? 

Whilst the Prince Group has now been sanctioned, the ease with which a transnational crime organisation accessed the UK and made it their home away from home should send alarm bells ringing. Not only did the group engage in torture in Cambodia whilst keeping a ledger of bribes, they also had links to Chinese security services, making this a national security issue. Here are five solutions to prevent this from happening again in the future. 

1. Publish in full the Government’s review into the Tier 1 Investor visa scheme, including how authorities are vetting all beneficiaries retrospectively. Successive administrations have ducked this task, seemingly hoping the issue will go away. Yet there remains a steady drip of cases into the public domain, which give little assurance Whitehall is on-top of the issue. Ministers need to get ahead of this and onto the front foot.
2. End corporate secrecy in Britain’s offshore financial centres, by, at the very least, providing those with a legitimate interest meaningful access to information about the owners of companies based on their shores. Our research has found Overseas Territories are behind on their pledge to do so, with Crown Dependencies expected to deliver access similar to the EU next year. They should redouble their efforts, with the UK Government providing strong incentives for delivery.
3. Police enablers more effectively, ensuring the private sector provide a strong first line of defence against illicit finance. As announced, the Government should promptly introduce legislation to bring the supervision of lawyers, accountants and formation agents under the FCA’s remit, alongside sufficient powers and resources for it do the job effectively.
4. Close the off-plan loophole. Currently properties bought directly off developers before they are built are subject to fewer checks than the resale real estate market. There is growing evidence that money launderers are taking advantage of this loophole, sometimes buying large swathes of property in one go. The Government should add property developers to the regulated sector to address this weak -spot in the UK’s anti-money laundering system.
5. Strengthen international action against dirty money. The UK is hosting an international summit on illicit finance next year. This represents a golden opportunity for the UK to step up and help build a movement to help tackle corruption, organised crime and transnational fraud that affects regular people not just around the world, but also in the UK.