Restoring trust in Scotland's democracy

1. The First Minister (FM) is to be commended for grasping the nettle on the complex issue of the threats posed to democratic norms by distrust, disinformation, inequality, discrimination and the rise of populism and negative polarisation as a societal response. Transparency International UK agrees that addressing the issues identified in the summit agenda should be prioritised and that they are interlinked.
2. At Transparency International UK we share the FM’s concern that distrust in politics is undermining democracy and democratic institutions. We agree that disinformation contributes to distrust. This includes but is not limited to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).
3. Restoring trust in politics is not a simple task, but the principles espoused by the Open Government Partnership (OGP) of transparency, accountability, participation and integrity are the foundations of a working democracy. We would suggest OGP is a useful available framework for taking forward any 
   actions from the summit.
4. Transparency International UK is the UK chapter of the international anti-corruption movement. We champion integrity and argue for protections against corruption. We are not experts in media law, social media or mis/disinformation. We have undertaken research to understand the impact of disinformation on democracy, integrity in public life and fighting corruption.
5. The rise in mis/disinformation changes the landscape in which we all operate, especially those of us who seek to persuade through expert evidence and research and who rely on trust in independent media outlets.
6. The damage caused by disinformation threatens to destabilise society and government and weaken democratic institutions.
7. Regardless of the source, disinformation alters public perceptions and distorts issue salience.
8. Upholding information integrity is essential to safeguarding freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas.
9. Governments should therefore seek both to provide accessible public communication distinct from political communication or government press releases and should protect civic space to ensure trusted organisations and media outlets can continue to offer impartial information.
10. Tackling disinformation therefore requires both limiting its prevalence and combating its impact on public perceptions. In this briefing, Transparency International UK argues for action to strengthen the integrity of information spaces, measures to limit the reach of and material benefits accrued by disinformation, societal interventions including media literacy and support for fact-based journalism, application of anti-corruption measures to the information space and consideration of how policy choices allow 
    disinformation to undermine democratic norms.

The Global Disinformation Index  defines disinformation as deliberately misleading information, knowingly spread, or the omission of certain facts in service of a particular narrative. 

They name four characteristics of disinformation: 

• The intent to mislead
• Financial or geopolitical motivations
• The aim to foster long-term social, political or economic conflict
• The risk of harm to at-risk individuals, groups or institutions.

This is distinguished from misinformation, which refers to the inadvertent spread of such content. 

The OECD report Fact not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity (2024), which  states that “the rapid and global spread of mis- and disinformation presents a fundamental risk to the free and fact-based exchange of information underpinning democratic debate” distinguishes further:

While “misinformation” can be defined as false or inaccurate information that is shared 
unknowingly and is not disseminated with the intention of deceiving the public and 
“malinformation” can be described as accurate information shared to cause harm, for example by 
moving information from the private to the public sphere, “disinformation” is usually defined as 
false, inaccurate, or misleading information deliberately created, presented and disseminated to 
harm a person, social group, organisation or country (U.S. Department of State, 2023) (Wardle 
and Derakshan, 2017); (Lesher, Pawelec and Desai, 2022). Waves of false and misleading 
content can undermine societal cohesion, cast doubt on factual information, and undermine trust in 
public institutions (OECD, 2021). 

Disinformation spreads through a complex interaction of social media, online news sites, traditional media, but also offline spaces. 

Source: UK POSTnote 719 

The UK Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST)note 719 (2024) found that 

• People may intentionally share disinformation to further a political agenda or achieve social validation, rather than because they believe it. It is more common for people to unintentionally share misinformation.
• People may be more likely to believe disinformation if it aligns with pre-existing beliefs, provokes an emotional response, especially a negative response like anger or envy, if they are repeatedly exposed to it, or if it comes from a source they trust.
• Frequent exposure to mis/disinformation can hinder the ability to identify credible information. A consequence may be distrust of all information, including from sources traditionally considered reliable.
• Behavioural change stemming from disinformation is usually the result of multiple drivers, including pre-existing beliefs, cultural/religious values, education, and location. 

Concrete impacts of disinformation include election interference; riots, violence and vandalism; public health effects through e.g. vaccine antipathy or targeted abuse of specific individuals or groups.

It also sows distrust in the pillars of a functioning democracy for example the media, judiciary and Parliament. Disinformation undermines those institutions as it exacerbates public distrust. Trust in both politics and information sources is vital to protect democracy and, of particular concern to Transparency International, prevent corruption.

But mis/disinformation also alters people’s perceptions of how democracy is functioning. It calls into question the very knowability of information. This undermines democratic norms, seeds doubt in the system and in society and creates public distrust.

For example, Broda and Strömbäck (2024) found that overestimations of the share of households who receive welfare lead people to develop anti-welfare attitudes, overestimations of the share of immigrants within a population lead to anti-immigration attitudes, and overestimations of crime levels increase people’s fear of crime and support for punitive policies. They conclude, “such findings underline that misperceptions threaten to warp mass opinion, undermine democratic debate, and distort public policy on issues ranging from climate change to vaccines.” 

Conversely, research indicates that people who regularly consume independent, professionally produced journalism are more resilient to disinformation.  This journalism is frequently behind a pay wall limiting access to those with the financial resources. 

Specifically, disinformation presents a number of concerns for anti-corruption activists:    

• Anti-corruption activism relies strongly on trust in independent media outlets and the use of social media, and the impact of disinformation in undermining this trust is a real threat.
• Activists might find themselves targeted by disinformation campaigns, damaging their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public – this happened to TI Nigeria who were the subject of fake news reports accusing them of blackmail, falsification of evidence and bribery. 
• There have also been disinformation campaigns against anti-corruption activists themselves. In Ukraine, anti-corruption activists at NGOs and officials at anti-corruption bodies in the country have been targeted by fake news stories, with the apparent objective to diminish the public’s faith in them.
• Disinformation has also been used in conjunction with ‘dark’ political advertising, obscuring the origin of campaign finances. Dark advertising, dirty money and hidden networks that actively seek to undermine democracies can be tackled by implementing anti-corruption tools such as restricting the ability of dark money to move through our financial systems, ensuring transparency of ownership of corporations, requiring publication of targeted political adverts and demanding due diligence on political donors and spending.

We posit that these concerns are not unique to anti-corruption activists but are shared by wider civic society.

There is no one magic fix to end disinformation. The tools we can use include the following as gathered from organisations such as Full Fact, the OECD, academic research and our own analysis. They can be classed into five broad categories:

1. Spaces of disinformation.
   • Limiting the spread of disinformation through fact checking or warnings of deception. 
   • Demanding transparency about the way platforms that are used to share disinformation are owned and financed, including how viral content is monetized  and how algorithms prioritise content. 
   • Requiring platforms’ compliance with independent standards for fact checking and related disclosures. 
2. Disinformation and the media.
   • Providing support for independent journalism and investigative journalists to ensure a strong, pluralistic and diverse media sector including through exploring financial support.
   • Protecting investigative journalists and corruption activists including by legislating to prevent Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). 
3. Disinformation and education.
   • Encouraging media literacy and raising awareness of how disinformation seeks to manipulate users.  
4. Disinformation and transparency.
   • Applying and extending anti-corruption policies to the information space to provide for transparency of ownership and sources of financing.
   • Further reform to political advertising , extending beyond imprint requirements to address targeting of ‘dark’ adverts. 
5. State and civic spaces and information integrity.
   • Ensuring that government provides impartial and easily accessible information that can be used to disprove falsehoods. 
   • Promoting and protecting civic space to support its fundamental role in protecting information integrity and exposing deception. 

Warnings of deception (which Meta’s own research  suggest leads 95% of people not to click on a post); understanding how disinformation is produced and shared; having information about algorithms, monetization of viral content, and ownership of publishing platforms and corporate media; plus ensuring support for independent investigative journalism at the national and local level and delivering media literacy education are suggested methods to allow for the exposure of disinformation and awareness of its impact. 

Although disinformation by its nature wants to be seen, and corrupt actors go to great lengths to stay undetected, there are similarities. Much like corruption, disinformation thrives in hiding its true nature, obfuscating its origins, and cares little about the extent of the harm it causes.  This means the strengthening of anti-corruption tools would also help to disrupt disinformation. For example, by bolstering the transparency of ownership of companies, greater publication of material that seeks to influence, and safeguarding trusted media outlets to expose wrongdoing. 

Finally, we must acknowledge that disinformation succeeds in its intent to mislead, create conflict and division and sow distrust because our political system allows unpopular practices to continue.  Public perceptions of politics are damaged by impressions of undue influence on decision makers from donors with deep pockets and those whose access is prioritised. These contributors to distrust must also be tackled alongside the actions to combat disinformation.